Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70632
Authors: 
Brewer, Elijah
Jackson, William E.
Wall, Larry D.
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2006-28
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the impact of the target chief executive officer's (CEO) postmerger position on the purchase premium and target shareholders' abnormal returns around the announcement of the deal in a sample of bank mergers during the period 1990-2004. We find evidence that the target shareholders' returns are negatively related to the postmerger position of their CEO. However, these lower returns are not matched by higher returns to the acquirer's shareholders, suggesting little or no wealth transfers. Additionally, our evidence suggests that the target CEO becoming a senior officer of the combined firm does not boost the overall value of the merger transaction.
Subjects: 
merger
acquisition
target CEO
corporate governance
JEL: 
G34
K22
J33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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