Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70449
Authors: 
Majumdar, Mukul
Yoo, Seung Han
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CAE Working Paper 11-04
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes Influence Peddling with interaction between human capital transfer and collusion-building aspects in a model, in which each government official regulates multiple firms simultaneously. We show that (i) there exists an optimal division rule for collusion between a sequence of qualified regulators and a firm; (ii) as the regulators increasingly benefit from the collusion, they strictly decrease regulation rates for the firm under collusion while strictly increasing regulation rates for a firm not under collusion; and (iii) post-government-employment restrictions are not effective policies, and an alternative policy can be suggested.
Subjects: 
revolving doors
signaling games
repeated games
JEL: 
D73
H83
L51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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