Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70399
Authors: 
Pavlov, Gregory
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Research Report, Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario 2010-2
Abstract: 
We extend the 'no-haggling' result of Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) to the class of linear multiproduct monopoly problems when the buyer's valuations are smoothly distributed. In particular we show that there is no loss for the seller in optimizing over mechanisms such that all allocations belong to the boundary of the feasible set. The set of potentially optimal mechanisms can be further restricted when the costs are sufficiently low: the optimal mechanisms use only allocations from the 'north-east' boundary of the feasible set and the null allocation.
Subjects: 
multidimensional screening
price discrimination
optimal selling strategies
mechanism design
JEL: 
C78
D42
D82
L11
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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