Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70262
Authors: 
Aidt, Toke
Jensen, Peter S.
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper: Public Choice 4132
Abstract: 
We study the consequences of franchise extension and ballot reform for the size of government in Western Europe between 1820 and 1913. We find that franchise extension exhibits a U-shaped association with revenue per capita and a positive association with spending per capita. Instrumental variables estimates, however, suggest that the U-shaped relationship may be non-causal and our fixed effects estimates point to substantial cross-country heterogeneity. Further, we find that the secret ballot did not matter for tax revenues per capita but might have expanded the size of government relative to GDP.
Subjects: 
suffrage
threat of revolution
taxation
size of government
JEL: 
D70
P16
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
714.76 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.