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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
cege Discussion Papers No. 120
Verlag: 
University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege), Göttingen
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper presents a model showing an incentive for a group of people to vote for higher tuition fees, even if these fees have no quality effect. The incentive is based on a non-monetary influence on utility, namely the social status or prestige of graduating. The basic assumption is that the higher the prestige is, the lower the number of people studying. In a static equilibrium, it is shown that a group of wealthier and more able people can exist that attempts to prevent others from studying.
JEL: 
I22
J24
H52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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