Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70217
Authors: 
Ehlers, Tim
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research 120
Abstract: 
This paper presents a model showing an incentive for a group of people to vote for higher tuition fees, even if these fees have no quality effect. The incentive is based on a non-monetary influence on utility, namely the social status or prestige of graduating. The basic assumption is that the higher the prestige is, the lower the number of people studying. In a static equilibrium, it is shown that a group of wealthier and more able people can exist that attempts to prevent others from studying.
JEL: 
I22
J24
H52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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