Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/70191 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2013-003
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
We suggest that procedures of monetarized bidding can facilitate co-operation in Elinor Ostrom type common(s) projects without crowding out communitarian faculties of self-governance. Axioms securing procedurally egalitarian bidding on the basis of declared monetary evaluations are introduced. They guarantee that all realized changes of a status quo are in an objective (pecuniary) sense equally advantageous for all members of the community. Some empirical evidence that procedurally fair bidding can promote communitarian co-operation rather than crowding it out, is presented. The practical scope and limits of procedural egalitarianism need further empirical exploration, though.
Schlagwörter: 
fair procedures
egalitarian mechanisms
unanimity
constitutional political economy
non-state communities
governing the commons
crowding out
JEL: 
H4
H61
D62
D63
D71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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