Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70191
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Kliemt, Hartmut
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-003
Abstract: 
We suggest that procedures of monetarized bidding can facilitate co-operation in Elinor Ostrom type common(s) projects without crowding out communitarian faculties of self-governance. Axioms securing procedurally egalitarian bidding on the basis of declared monetary evaluations are introduced. They guarantee that all realized changes of a status quo are in an objective (pecuniary) sense equally advantageous for all members of the community. Some empirical evidence that procedurally fair bidding can promote communitarian co-operation rather than crowding it out, is presented. The practical scope and limits of procedural egalitarianism need further empirical exploration, though.
Subjects: 
fair procedures
egalitarian mechanisms
unanimity
constitutional political economy
non-state communities
governing the commons
crowding out
JEL: 
H4
H61
D62
D63
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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