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Autoren: 
Otsubo, Hironori
Datum: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2012,020
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper experimentally investigates the effect of limits on campaign spending and outcome in an electoral contest where two candidates, an incumbent and a challenger, compete for office in terms of the amount of campaign expenditure. The candidates are asymmetric only in that the incumbent wins the contest in case of a tie. Theory predicts that in the presence of such asymmetry spending limits put the challenger at a disadvantage and tightening the limits leads to further entrenchment of the incumbent. The experimental results confirmed the theoretical predictions regarding the effect of limits on campaign spending and outcome but yielded partial support to other predictions.
Schlagwörter: 
Contest
All-pay auction
Spending limit
Incumbency advantage
Experiment
JEL: 
C72
C92
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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