Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70161
Authors: 
Otsubo, Hironori
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2012,020
Abstract: 
This paper experimentally investigates the effect of limits on campaign spending and outcome in an electoral contest where two candidates, an incumbent and a challenger, compete for office in terms of the amount of campaign expenditure. The candidates are asymmetric only in that the incumbent wins the contest in case of a tie. Theory predicts that in the presence of such asymmetry spending limits put the challenger at a disadvantage and tightening the limits leads to further entrenchment of the incumbent. The experimental results confirmed the theoretical predictions regarding the effect of limits on campaign spending and outcome but yielded partial support to other predictions.
Subjects: 
Contest
All-pay auction
Spending limit
Incumbency advantage
Experiment
JEL: 
C72
C92
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
437.16 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.