Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70145
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Mugera, Harriet
Musau, Andrew
Ploner, Matteo
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2012,029
Abstract: 
We experimentally manipulate the efficiency of trust and reciprocity in a modified Investment Game. The aim of our manipulation is to test whether reciprocity is mainly affected by payoff consequences of trust or by intentions underlying it. We find that intentions matter and that consequences have an asymmetric impact: trustees reward trust more when trust is more efficient but do not adjust rewards to the efficiency of their own actions. As a result, profitability of trust is fostered by efficiency of trust as well as by efficiency of reciprocity. However, trustors do not fully exploit the high efficiency gains offered by investments and display only moderate trust.
Subjects: 
trust and reciprocity
other-regarding
preferences
experiment
JEL: 
C72
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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