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Autoren: 
Berninghaus, Siegfried K.
Haller, Sven
Krüger, Tyll
Neumann, Thomas
Schosser, Stephan
Datum: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2012,033
Zusammenfassung: 
For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and information on behavioral choices and determined the equilibria. We observed that the participants' risk attitudes failed to explain their choices between corrupt and non-corrupt behavior. Instead, beliefs appeared to be a better predictor of whether or not they would opt for the corrupt alternative. Furthermore, varying the quantity of information available to players (modeled by changing the degree of uncertainty) provided additional insight into the players' propensity to engage in corrupt behavior. The experimental results show that a higher degree of uncertainty in the informational setting reduces corruption.
Schlagwörter: 
Corruption
game theory
experiment
risk attitude
beliefs
JEL: 
D73
K42
C91
C92
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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