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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1997
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series No. 48
Verlag: 
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), Vienna
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we take up a model of Okada (1996) to describe the possibility of collective cooperation in a n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game by means of institutional arrangements. In addition, we introduce the possibility to corrupt the institutional authority by paying him some positive transfer in order not to be punished in case of defection. It is shown that there exists a maximal number of corrupting and defecting agents such that the organization is still formed and the rest of the population cooperates.
Schlagwörter: 
corruption
cooperation
prisoner's dilemma
organization
JEL: 
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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