Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/70093 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 85
Publisher: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Abstract: 
This paper studies the impact of software piracy in a two-sidedmarket setting. Software platforms attract developers and users to maximize their profits. The equilibrium price structure is affected by piracy: license fees to developers are higher with more software protection but the impact on user prices is ambiguous. A conflict between platforms and software developers over software protection may arise: whereas one side benefits from better protection, the other party loses out. Under platform compatibility, this conflict is no longer present.
Subjects: 
developer
piracy
platform
software
two-sided markets
JEL: 
L11
L86
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-084-0
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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