Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69993
Authors: 
Groll, Thomas
Ellis, Christopher J.
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper: Public Finance 4110
Abstract: 
In this paper we model the commercial lobbying industry (such as the so-called K-Street lobbyists of Washington, D.C.). In contrast to classical special interest groups commercial lobbying firms are not directly motivated by policy outcomes. They exist to make profits by selling intermediaries services between their clients and policymakers. We explain why these firms exist, and their implications for social welfare. We find that in a simple general equilibrium framework the market level of commercial lobbying services is typically socially inefficient, and characterize the nature of the distortions involved.
Subjects: 
lobbying
influence activities
information acquisition
financial contributions
commercial lobbying firms
political access
JEL: 
D72
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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