Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69543
Authors: 
Borcan, Oana
Lindahl, Mikael
Mitrut, Andreea
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper: Economics of Education 4038
Abstract: 
This paper aims to understand how corruption responds to an income loss. We exploit an unexpected 25% wage cut incurred in 2010 by all Romanian public sector employees, including the public education staff. We investigate a corruptible high-stake exam taking place shortly after the wage announcement. To measure corruption we compare changes in exam outcomes from 2009 to 2010 between public and private schools, as the latter were not affected by the policy. We find that the wage loss induced better exam outcomes in public than in private schools and we attribute this difference to increased corruption by public educators.
Subjects: 
public educators
bribes
high-stakes exam
JEL: 
I20
H70
J30
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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