Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69540
Authors: 
Hoffmann, Magnus
Kolmar, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper: Public Choice 4104
Abstract: 
We analyze equilibria of two-player contests where players have intention-based preferences. We find that players invest more effort compared to the case with selfish preferences and are even willing to exert effort when the monetary value of the prize converges to zero. As a consequence, overdissipation occurs if the value of the prize is sufficiently small.
Subjects: 
contests
intention-based fairness preferences
JEL: 
D03
D72
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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