Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/69430 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 7088
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Questions about compensation structures and incentive effects of pay-for-performance components are important for firms' Human Resource Management as well as for economics in general and labor economics in particular. This paper provides scarce insider econometric evidence on the structure and the incentive effects of fixed base salaries, paid bonuses, and agreed bonuses under a Management-by-Objectives (MBO) incentive scheme. Six years of personnel data of 177 managers in a German company are analyzed. The main findings are: (1) base salaries increase significantly with age, whereas bonuses decrease with age; (2) larger agreed bonuses are correlated with fewer absent working days.
Subjects: 
absenteeism
bonus
effort
incentives
insider econometrics
wages
JEL: 
J22
J24
J31
J33
M12
M52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
155.67 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.