Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69428
Authors: 
Markussen, Simen
Røed, Knut
Røgeberg, Ole J.
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 7122
Abstract: 
Based on administrative data from Norway, we examine the extent to which family doctors influence their clients' propensity to claim sick pay and disability benefits. The analysis is based on exogenous shifts of family doctors occurring when physicians quit, retire, or for other reasons sell their patient lists to other doctors. Our key finding is that family doctors have significant influence on their clients' benefit claims. We conclude that it is possible for family doctors to contain social insurance costs to some extent, and that there is a significant variation across doctors in the way they do so.
Subjects: 
sick pay
disability insurance
absence certification
gatekeepers
JEL: 
H55
I13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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