Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69418
Authors: 
Epstein, Gil S.
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 7023
Abstract: 
This paper presents a model in which promotion of employees within the internal firm hierarchy is determined by the individuals' allocation of time between promotion/rent-seeking and productive activity. We consider the effect of an increase in the employer's knowledge (information) regarding the employees' productivity levels on the total time spent by the workers in non-productive promotion-seeking activities.
Subjects: 
promotion-seeking activities
contest
knowledge
JEL: 
D2
D72
J2
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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