Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/69386 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 7128
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate the relationship between life cycle wages and individual membership of unemployment insurance schemes in Denmark. We separate permanent from transitory wages and characterise them using membership of unemployment insurance funds. We find that unemployment insurance is associated with lower wage growth heterogeneity over the life cycle and greater wage instability, changing the nature of wage inequality from permanent to transitory. While we are in general unable to formally test for moral hazard against adverse selection into unemployment insurance, robustness checks suggest that moral hazard is the relevant interpretation.
Schlagwörter: 
unemployment insurance
wage dynamics
wage inequality
wage instability
JEL: 
J31
J65
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
325.62 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.