Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Mohr, Ernst
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge, Serie A: Volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Statistik, Universität Konstanz 206
This paper provides a model of natural resource exploration, where the sole motivation to explore arises from a strategic incentive to preempt competitors. It is assumed that private ownership rights over a finite unexplored and commonly held resource stock can be established through a costly deterministic exploration process. The open-loop and the feedback Nash equilibrium is analysed. It is shown that in between intervals of soaring exploratory activities there may be an interval where exploration is declining over time.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
970.82 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.