Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68642
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Kirchsteiger, Georg
Ritzberger, Klaus
Year of Publication: 
1996
Series/Report no.: 
Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series, Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) 35
Abstract: 
In a two-stage extensive form game where followers can observe moves by leaders only with noise, pure subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the limiting game without noise may not survive arbitrarily small noise. Still, for generic games, there is always at least one subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game with no noise that is approximated by equilibrium outcomes of games with small noise. This, however, depends crucially on generic payoffs.
Subjects: 
commitments
imperfect observability
subgame perfection
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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