Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68492
Authors: 
Anger, Silke
Year of Publication: 
May-2008
Citation: 
[Journal:] Scottish Journal of Political Economy [ISSN:] 1467-9485 [Volume:] 55 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 167-189
Abstract: 
This paper provides an explanation for the empirically proven relationship between overtime and future benefits. We suggest an internal signaling model, in which a worker signals his value to the employer by supplying unpaid overtime. In our empirical analysis, we examine whether overtime has in fact a signaling component. Variations in collectively bargained hours between industries are exploited, as they imply different overtime thresholds for workers with the same number of actual hours. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study for the years 1993–2004, a positive signaling value of unpaid overtime is found for West German workers.
Subjects: 
Unpaid Overtime
Internal Signaling
Asymmetric Information
JEL: 
J22
D82
J41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Additional Information: 
The definitive version is available at onlinelibrary.wiley.com: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9485.2008.00449.x
Document Type: 
Article

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