Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68228
Authors: 
Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
Wey, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 81
Abstract: 
We analyze the effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly when the antitrust agency applies a consumer surplus standard. Remedies increase the scope for pro…table and acceptable mergers, while divestitures to an entrant …rm are most effective in this regard. Remedial divestitures are most attractive from a social welfare point of view, when the merging parties can extract the entire gains associated with the asset sale. We also show that the merging parties have strong incentives to search for the most efficient buyer. Finally, we identify instances so that a remedy rule induces strictly price-decreasing mergers.
Subjects: 
Remedies
Divestiture
Merger Control
Oligopoly
Synergies
JEL: 
L13
L41
K21
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-080-2
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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