Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68112
Authors: 
Pedersen, Pål Andreas
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Department of Economics Discussion Paper, University of Kent 01,05
Abstract: 
A theoretical model is adopted in order to explain incentives and actual safety behaviour for drivers, pedestrians and other road users which do not utilise motorised vehicles. A road user's outcome is supposed to be dependent on her individual actions and cares decided upon by other individuals utilising the roads simultaneously, as well as on external traffic safety conditions. By varying the types of road users meeting in traffic and the order of moves taken, several different games are identified, analysed and compared. In addition to focussing on the possible strategic interactions between the road users and the outcomes most likely to be found in different situations, we discuss the existence and size of moral hazard effects caused by improvements in external safety conditions.
Subjects: 
Road safety
strategic interaction
moral hazard
JEL: 
R4
C7
D8
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
119.67 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.