Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/68075 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 05,01
Publisher: 
University of Kent, Department of Economics, Canterbury
Abstract: 
We consider a dynamic model of conformity that permits both a conformist and non-conformist equilibrium. We provide conditions under which conformity can 'invade' a population. More precisely, starting from a non-conformist equilibrium, we show that the conformity of an arbitrarily small proportion of the population can lead to the spread of conformism and the ultimate emergence of the conformist equilibrium. This occurs independently of whether or not the non-conformist equilibrium Pareto dominates the conformist equilibrium.
Subjects: 
Conformity
best reply
coordination
norm
JEL: 
C70
D01
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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