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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 05,02
Verlag: 
University of Kent, Department of Economics, Canterbury
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, we construct a model of market structure in the global arms industry linking concentration, military procurement, international trade and regional conflict. We show how concentration depends on the willingness of producers to import for their military needs and on the relative size of the external market of non-producers. We show that there can be substantial gains to producers from cooperation in the procurement process, but also small gains to non-producers involved in regional arms races. Arms export controls that limit the level of technology that can be exported to non-producers distribute these cooperative gains from producers to non-producers.
Schlagwörter: 
military procurement
market structure
arms trade
arms races
JEL: 
F12
H56
L10
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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