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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2006-04
Verlag: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Zusammenfassung: 
We present a simple classroom principal-agent experiment that can effectively be used as a teaching device to introduce important concepts of organizational economics and contracting. In a first part, students take the role of a principal and design a contract that consists of a fixed payment and an incentive component. In the second part, students take the role of agents and decide on an effort level. The experiment can be used to introduce students to the concepts of efficiency, incentive compatibility, outside options and participation constraints, the Coase theorem, and fairness and reciprocity in contracting.
Schlagwörter: 
Classroom experiments
post-contractual opportunism
incentive contracts
efficiency
reciprocity
Coase theorem
JEL: 
A22
C92
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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