Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67971
Authors: 
Bardsley, Nicholas
Sausgruber, Rupert
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper, The University of Nottingham 2003-01
Abstract: 
People contribute more to public goods, the more others give ('crowding-in'). We investigate two possible causes of crowding-in: reciprocity, the usual explanation, and conformism, a neglected alternative. The issue is important since conformism has more scope to bring about endogenous social interaction effects outside the laboratory. We use Bardsley's (2000) Conditional Information Lottery design to control 'others' behaviour' without deception. We observe how contributions correlate within a group and between groups. Our main result is that conformism does cause crowding-in. The common presumption of reciprocity therefore deserves to be questioned, even in the laboratory.
Subjects: 
public goods
reciprocity
conformism
social interaction
deception
JEL: 
C9
C92
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
440.84 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.