Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67845
Authors: 
Usher, Dan
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper 1245
Abstract: 
Government by majority rule voting requires that compromise be attainable, but not too easily. Little of the nation's business could be transacted without an ability on the part of the legislators and political parties to strike bargains, but government by majority rule voting could not withstand a bargaining equilibrium comparable to the general equilibrium in a competitive economy. Democratic government is designed to foster bargaining where it should be fostered and to impede bargaining where it should be impeded.
Subjects: 
Bargaining
Majority rule voting
JEL: 
C70
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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