Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67836
Authors: 
Ferrall, Christopher
Salvanes, Kjell G.
Sørensen, Erik Ø.
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper 1200
Abstract: 
We develop an equilibrium model of wages and estimate it using administrative data from Norway. Coworkers interact through a task-assignment model, and wages are determined through multi-lateral bargaining over the surplus that accrues to the workforce. Seniority affects wages through workplace output and relative bargaining power. These channels are separately identified by imposing equilibrium restrictions on data observing all workers within workplaces. We find joint production is important. Seniority affects bargaining power but is unproductive. We reinterpret gender and firm-size effects in wages in light of the rejection of linearly separable production.
Subjects: 
Wage Distributions
Productivity
Matched Data
Multilateral Bargaining
Assignment Models
JEL: 
D2
J24
J3
J7
L25
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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