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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 1179
Verlag: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper provides a conceptual framework on fair collective choice rules that synthesizes the studies of Goldman and Sussangkarn (1978) and Suzumura (1981) on the one hand and Tadenuma (2002, 2005) on the other. We show that both frameworks have the following binary relation as a common origin: an allocation x is at least as good as an allocation z if (i) x Pareto dominates z, or (ii) x equity-dominates z. Its transitive-closure and the strict relation derive different ranking criteria, but remarkably, with respect to the maximal elements, they have a set-inclusive relationship.
Schlagwörter: 
Welfare Economics
Social Choice
Efficiency
Equity
No-Envy
JEL: 
D61
D63
D71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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