Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67814
Authors: 
Nishimura, Yukihiro
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper 1179
Abstract: 
This paper provides a conceptual framework on fair collective choice rules that synthesizes the studies of Goldman and Sussangkarn (1978) and Suzumura (1981) on the one hand and Tadenuma (2002, 2005) on the other. We show that both frameworks have the following binary relation as a common origin: an allocation x is at least as good as an allocation z if (i) x Pareto dominates z, or (ii) x equity-dominates z. Its transitive-closure and the strict relation derive different ranking criteria, but remarkably, with respect to the maximal elements, they have a set-inclusive relationship.
Subjects: 
Welfare Economics
Social Choice
Efficiency
Equity
No-Envy
JEL: 
D61
D63
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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