Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67808
Autoren: 
Koeppl, Thorsten V.
Monnet, Cyril
Datum: 
2010
Reihe/Nr.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper 1241
Zusammenfassung: 
We explain why central counterparties (CCPs) emerged historically. With standardized contracts, it is optimal to insure counterparty risk by clearing those contracts through a CCP that uses novation and mutualization. As netting is not essential for these services, it does not explain why CCPs exist. In over-the-counter markets, as contracts are customized and not fungible, a CCP cannot fully guarantee contract performance. Still, a CCP can help: As bargaining leads to an inefficient allocation of default risk relative to the gains from customization, a transfer scheme is needed. A CCP can implement it by offering partial insurance for customized contracts.
Schlagwörter: 
Counterparty Risk
Novation
Mutualization
Over-the-counter Markets
Customized Financial Contracts
JEL: 
G2
G13
D53
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
406.13 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.