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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 1212
Verlag: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Zusammenfassung: 
The granting of stock options to employees who have negligible impact on company performance intuitively violates Holmstrom's (1979) sufficient statistic result. This paper revisits the sufficient statistic question of when to condition a contract on an outside signal in a principal-agent model in which I introduce imprecise (or vague) information. The paper applies a choice theoretic framework introduced in Olszewski (2007) and Ahn (2008) and extended by Viero (2009a), who denoted it vague environments. I show that if the signal is vague, Holmstrom's result can be overturned.
Schlagwörter: 
contracts
vagueness
optimism
incentives
signals
stock options
JEL: 
D20
D80
D82
D86
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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