Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67728
Authors: 
Usher, Dan
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper 1239
Abstract: 
We know that people strike bargains and that civilized life could not proceed otherwise. Bargaining models yield solutions comparable to the general equilibrium in a competitive economy with universal self-interested behaviour subject only to economy-wide rules. Such models can be based upon a shared sense of what is fair, a sequences of concessions or an imposed bargaining procedure. The assumptions in these models are so from bargaining as it is experienced and the requirements for equilibrium so stringent that, if anything, the models serve to reduce confidence that bargains will actually be struck. Confidence in the efficacy of bargaining is more appropriately based upon experience rather than upon bargaining theory. 1) Bargaining Unexplained, page 2. 2) Bargaining Assumptions in the Study of Politics, Law and War, page 27. 3) Bargaining and Voting, page 49.
Subjects: 
bargaining
voting
fairness
equilibrium
JEL: 
C70
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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