Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/67434 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] The Open Economics Journal [ISSN:] 1874-9194h [Volume:] 1 [Publisher:] Bentham Open [Place:] Sharjah [Year:] 2008 [Pages:] 47-54
Verlag: 
Bentham Open, Sharjah
Zusammenfassung: 
A contract where the agent is compensated ex post only upon satisfactory performance, often called a no-cureno-pay contract, can arise as under several circumstances. In this paper, we model the problem of contractual choice as a principal-agent contract which is modified due to hidden information about the competence of the agent to fulfill the obligations of the contract. The agent offers a choice of contracts to the principal, thereby signalling agent competence to the principal, and there is no alternative reputation mechanism to the contract for the principal's bargaining strategy. It turns out that in this situation, the optimal contract will have a form which may be recognized as a no-cure-no-pay contract.
Schlagwörter: 
contracts
no-cure-no-pay
principal-agent model
asymmetric information
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