Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/67105 
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dc.contributor.authorCoenen, Michaelen
dc.contributor.authorJovanovic, Draganen
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-06-
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-06T12:05:16Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-06T12:05:16Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-076-5en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/67105-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze a constrained dictator game in which the dictator splits a pie which will be subsequently created through simultaneous investments by herself and the recipient. We consider two treatments by varying the maximum attainable size of the pie leading to either high or low investment incentives. We find that constrained dictators and recipients invest less than a model with self-interested players would predict. While the splitting decisions of constrained dictators correspond to the theoretical predictions when investment incentives are high, they are more selfish when investment incentives are low. Overall, team productivity is negatively affected by lower investment incentives.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHeinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) |cDüsseldorfen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDICE Discussion Paper |x77en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelD01en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordBargaining Gameen
dc.subject.keywordDictator Gameen
dc.subject.keywordInvestment Incentivesen
dc.subject.keywordTeam Productionen
dc.titleInvestment behavior in a constrained dictator game-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn731431553en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:77en

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