Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67105
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dc.contributor.authorCoenen, Michaelen_US
dc.contributor.authorJovanovic, Draganen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-06T12:05:16Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-06T12:05:16Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-076-5en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/67105-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze a constrained dictator game in which the dictator splits a pie which will be subsequently created through simultaneous investments by herself and the recipient. We consider two treatments by varying the maximum attainable size of the pie leading to either high or low investment incentives. We find that constrained dictators and recipients invest less than a model with self-interested players would predict. While the splitting decisions of constrained dictators correspond to the theoretical predictions when investment incentives are high, they are more selfish when investment incentives are low. Overall, team productivity is negatively affected by lower investment incentives.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDICE |cDüsseldorfen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDICE Discussion Paper |x77en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD01en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBargaining Gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordDictator Gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordInvestment Incentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordTeam Productionen_US
dc.titleInvestment behavior in a constrained dictator gameen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn731431553en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:77-

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