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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 3981
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a general model of legal and illegal immigration to understand the basic tradeoffs faced by a government in the decision to implement an immigration amnesty in the presence of a selective immigration policy. We show that two channels play an important role: an amnesty is more likely the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the less redistributive is the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on a novel panel dataset of legalizations carried out by a group of OECD countries between 1980-2007 broadly supports the role played by the channels identified in our theoretical model.
Schlagwörter: 
illegal immigration
amnesties
labor market mismatch
welfare state
JEL: 
F22
J61
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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