Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/66780 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 12-071
Publisher: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Abstract: 
We provide an empirical assessment of EC cartel enforcement decisions between 2000 and 2011. Following an initial characterisation of our dataset, we especially investigate the determinants of the duration of cartel investigations. We are able to identify several key drivers of investigation length such as the Commission's speed of cartel detection, the type of cartel agreement, the affected industry or the existence of a chief witness.
Subjects: 
Competition Policy
Empirical Analysis
Cartels
European Union
Fines
Leniency
Duration of Investigation
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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