Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66699
Authors: 
Clerger, Gaspard
Chávez, Carlos
Villena, Mauricio
Gómez, Walter
Year of Publication: 
2009
Citation: 
[Journal:] Estudios de Economía [ISSN:] 0718-5286 [Volume:] 36 [Year:] 2009 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 165-190
Abstract (Translated): 
We study the cost-effectiveness of a transferable emissions permit system (TEPS) vis a vis a system of emissions standards. Our analysis includes along with abatement costs, the costs of enforcing the system to induce compliance. Further, the analysis considers complete and incomplete information. The numerical simulations are performed for the case of fixed sources operating under the Emissions Compensation Program (ECP) in Santiago, Chile. The results suggest that a TEPS is not able to induce compliance at minimum enforcement costs, but this regulatory system allow the regulator to achieve the environmental target with minimum aggregate compliance costs.
Subjects: 
environmental policy
cost-effectiveness
enforcement costs incomplete information
JEL: 
L51
Q28
K42
K32
Document Type: 
Article

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