Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66689
Authors: 
Contreras, Roberto
Georgantzis, Nikolaos
Ginés, Miguel
Year of Publication: 
2008
Citation: 
[Journal:] Estudios de Economía [ISSN:] 0718-5286 [Volume:] 35 [Year:] 2008 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 19-31
Abstract (Translated): 
We study cartel stability in a differentiated price-setting duopoly with returns to scale. We show that a cartel may be equally stable in the presence of lower differentiation, provided that the decreasing returns parameter is high. In addition we demonstrate that for a given factor of discount, there are technologies that can have decreasing returns to scale where the cartel always is stable independent of the differentiation degree.
Subjects: 
collusion
product differentiation
decreasing returns to scale
JEL: 
C70
D21
D43
Document Type: 
Article

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