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Erscheinungsjahr: 
1997
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB 373 Discussion Paper No. 1997,104
Verlag: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
If one abstracts from specially organized markets like stock or commodity exchanges, (international) trade relies on bargaining between the interested parties. Whereas earlier the results of bargaining were seen as unpredictable or determined by an at most vaguely defined concept of (relative) bargaining power, it is simply a field of application in view of game theory. Our discussion tries to elaborate the specific institutional aspects of international bargaining with interacting parties from different countries. Especially, we concentrate on the problem when contracts resulting from international bargaining are unenforceable.
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