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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1997
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB 373 Discussion Paper No. 1997,53
Verlag: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
In a model with private information of the worker about her ability and unobservable effort choice, the role of public and private employment services is analyzed. The coexistence of an inefficient employment exchange and an efficient private agency may lead to optimal screening with first best contracts. This is due to the assumption that good types of workers lose more human capital than bad types in periods of unemployment or mismatch. A bad type of worker earns an information rent if the employment exchange is inefficient and the employer chooses not to use the private agency.
Schlagwörter: 
principal agent
screening contracts
employment services
JEL: 
D82
D83
J41
J64
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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