Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66233
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dc.contributor.authorDulleck, Uween_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-19T15:21:58Z-
dc.date.available2012-11-19T15:21:58Z-
dc.date.issued1997en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10064273en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/66233-
dc.description.abstractIn Rubinstein's (1989) E-mail game there exists no Nash equilibrium where players use strategies that condition on the E-mail communication. In this paper I restrict the utilizable information for one player. I show that in contrast to Rubinstein's result, in a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium players use strategies that condition on the number of messages sent. Therefore - induction under the assumption of bounded rational behavior of at least one player leads to a more intuitive equilibrium in the E-mail game.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aHumboldt-Universität |cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes |x1997,47en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordInductionen_US
dc.subject.keywordSubgame Perfect Equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordInformation setsen_US
dc.subject.keywordImperfect recallen_US
dc.titleA note on the E-mail game: Bounded rationality and inductionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn729366219en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:sfb373:199747-

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