Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/66121 
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dc.contributor.authorBilotkach, Volodymyren
dc.contributor.authorHüschelrath, Kaien
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-08T16:16:50Z-
dc.date.available2012-11-08T16:16:50Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/66121-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the issue of market foreclosure by airline partnerships with antitrust immunity. Overlapping data on frequency of service and passenger volumes on non-stop transatlantic routes with information on the dynamics of airline partnerships, we find evidence consistent with the airlines operating under antitrust immunity refusing to accept connecting passengers from the outside carriers at respective hub airports. Following the antitrust immunity, airlines outside the partnership reduce their traffic to the partner airlines' hub airports by 4.1-11.5 percent. We suggest regulators should take possible market foreclosure effects into account when assessing the competitive effects of antitrust immunity for airline alliances.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x10-083 [rev.]en
dc.subject.jelL41en
dc.subject.jelL93en
dc.subject.jelK21en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordair transportationen
dc.subject.keywordalliancesen
dc.subject.keywordantitrust immunityen
dc.subject.keywordforeclosureen
dc.titleAirline alliances, antitrust immunity and market foreclosure-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn729304582en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:10083ren

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