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dc.contributor.authorKoehne, Sebastianen
dc.contributor.authorKuhn, Moritzen
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-07T14:06:17Z-
dc.date.available2012-11-07T14:06:17Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/66056-
dc.description.abstractEmpirical studies show that job search behavior depends on the financial situation of the unemployed. Starting from this observation, we ask how unemployment insurance policy should take the individual financial situation into account. We use a quantitative model with a realistically calibrated unemployment insurance system, individual consumption-saving decision and moral hazard during job search to answer this question and find that the optimal policy provides unemployment benefits that increase with individual assets. By implicitly raising interest rates, asset-increasing benefits encourage self-insurance, which facilitates consumption smoothing during unemployment, but does not exacerbate moral hazard for job search. Asset-increasing benefits also have desirable properties from a dynamic perspective, because they emulate key features of the dynamics of constrained efficient allocations. The welfare gain from introducing asset-increasing benefits is substantial and amounts to 1.5 % of consumption when comparing steady states and 0.8 % of consumption when taking transition costs into account. More generous replacement rates or benefits targeted to asset-poor households, by contrast, have a negative effect on welfare.en
dc.language.isogeren
dc.publisherZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |xKiel und Hamburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Labor Markets and Optimal Policy |xD18-V1en
dc.subject.jelE21en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelJ65en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titleShould unemployment insurance be asset-tested?-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn731314611en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:vfsc12:66056en

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