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Horst, Ulrich
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SFB 373 Discussion Paper 2002,74
We consider the stochastic sequence {Yi}t E N defined recursively by the linear relation Yt+l = AtYt + Bt in a random environment. The environment is described by the stochastic process {(At, Bt ) }t E N and is under the simultaneous control of several agents playing a discounted stochastic game. We formulate sufficient conditions on the game which ensure the existence of Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies which has the additional property that, in equilibrium, the process {Yt} t E N converges in distribution to a unique stationary sequence.
Stochastic difference equation
stochastic stability
stochastic games
random systems with complete connections
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Working Paper

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