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dc.contributor.authorHildenbrand, Andreasen
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-11-
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-11T13:39:55Z-
dc.date.available2012-10-11T13:39:55Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64824-
dc.description.abstractIndustrial organization is mainly concerned with the behavior of large firms, especially when it comes to oligopoly theory. Experimental industrial organization therefore faces a problem: How can firms be brought into the laboratory? The main approach relies on framing: Call individuals firms! This experimental approach is not in line with modern industrial organization, according to which a firm's market behavior is also determined by its organizational structure. In this paper, a Stackelberg experiment is considered in order to answer the question whether framing individual decision making as organizational decision making or implementing an organizational structure is more effective in generating profit-maximizing behavior. Firms are either represented by individuals or by teams. Teams are organized according to Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) contractual view of the firm. I find that teams' quantity choices are more in line with the assumption of profit maximization than individuals' choices. Compared to individuals, teams appear to be less inequality averse.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKielen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aEconomics Discussion Papers |x2012-53en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordindustrial organizationen
dc.subject.keywordStackelberg gameen
dc.subject.keywordindividual behaviouren
dc.subject.keywordteam behaviouren
dc.subject.keywordframingen
dc.subject.keywordexperimental economicsen
dc.titleIs a "firm" a firm? A Stackelberg experiment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn727377787en
dc.rights.licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.enen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201253en

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